Reliable broadcast is a powerful primitive guaranteeing that, intuitively, all processes in a distributed system deliver the same set of messages.
Introduction
Networks typically offer a reliable form of communication channels: TCP. As an abstraction, these channels ensure that if neither the sender nor the receiver of a message fail, then the message is eventually delivered. Essentially, the very fact that certain messages might be lost when sent through the underlying IP layer is hidden through re-transmission schemes to the user of the TCP abstraction.
Yet, for many applications, TCP is not reliable enough. Indeed, think of the situation where a message needs to be * is work has been supported in part by a grant from Interchain Foundation. sent to all processes of a distributed system. If the sender does not fail, TCP will do the job; but otherwise, the message might reach only a strict subset of processes. is can be problematic in certain applications, such as a financial notification service when processes subscribe to information published by other processes. For fairness reasons, one might want to ensure that if the sender fails, either all or no process receives the message. We talk about reliable broadcast. Such a primitive does not ensure that messages are delivered in the same total order, but simply in an "all-or-nothing" manner.
It turns out that reliable broadcast is very appealing. It can be used to implement many applications, including, for example, a crypto-currency [12] . Indeed, unlike what was implicitly considered since Nakamoto's original paper [21] , there is no need to ensure consensus on the ordering of messages, i.e., to totally order messages, if the goal is to perform secure payments. A reliable broadcast scheme suffices.
Reliable broadcast is also appealing because, unlike stronger primitives like total order broadcast and consensus, it has been shown to be implementable deterministically in a completely asynchronous environment [4] . e basic idea is to assume a quorum of correct processes, and make that quorum responsible of ensuring that a message is transmi ed to all processes if the original sender of the message fails. In the case where the message did not reach the quorum, it is not delivered by any process. It is important to notice at this point a terminology difference between the act of "receiving" and the act of "delivering" a message. A process indeed might "receive" a message, but might not "deliver" it to its application until it is confident that the "all-or-nothing" property of reliable broadcast is ensured.
A closer look at all asynchronous implementations reveals, however, a gap between theory and practice. e asynchronous implementations of reliable broadcast that have been described so far all assume a static system. Essentially, the set of processes in the system remains the same, except that some of them might fail. e ability of new process to join the system or processes to explicitly ask to leave the system, which is very desirable in a long-lived application supposed to be highly available, is precluded in all asynchronous reliable broadcast protocols published so far.
Some very interesting approaches have been proposed to emulate a shared memory abstraction in an asynchronous and dynamic message passing environment (i.e., without consensus). 1 ese include [1] , [17] , [10] and [2] . Our work is highly inspired by [2] which algorithmic and theoretical approach we adapt to an arbitrary failure model. However, [2] (and [1, 17, 10] ) considered a crash-stop failure model. In contrast, (a) we tackle the problem of a dynamic broadcasting system, instead of shared memory emulation, and (b) consider an arbitrary failure model (Byzantine failures), instead of crash failures.
We introduce the first specification of a dynamic Byzantine reliable broadcast ( ) primitive that is amenable to an asynchronous implementation. Namely, any process that is outside the broadcast system can ask to join it, and will join, if the process is correct; any process that is inside the broadcast system can ask to leave it, and will eventually leave. Processes inside the system can broadcast and deliver messages, whereas processes outside the system cannot. Our specification is intended for an asynchronous system for it does not require agreement on which processes are in the system. In other words, our specification does not build on top of a group membership scheme, as does the classical view synchronous abstraction [7] .
We present an algorithm that implements a dynamic Byzantine reliable broadcast ( ) primitive in an asynchronous environment, ensuring that if a correct process in the system broadcast (resp. delivers) a message, then eventually every correct process either delivers that message or leaves the system. Our implementation is optimal according to two dimensions. First, we assume that, at any point in time, 2/3 of the processes inside the broadcast system are correct, which is tight. Second, we show that the "all-or-nothing" property we ensure is, in some sense, maximal. More specifically, we prove that in an asynchronous system, even if only one process in the system can fail, and it can merely fail by crashing, then it is impossible to implement a stronger property, ensuring that if any correct process in the system broadcasts (resp. delivers) a message, then every correct process in the system delivers that message, including those that eventually leave.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. We first describe the system model we consider and give a specification of ( §2). en we provide high level insights about our algorithm implementing ( §3). We then discuss the full algorithm ( §4), prove its correctness ( §5) and optimality ( §6). Finally, we conclude this paper by discussing related work ( §7).
Model and Specification
We now describe the system model we consider ( §2.1) and specify our primitive ( § § 2.2 to 2.4).
A Universe of Asynchronous Processes
We consider a universe U of processes, some of which are subject to arbitrary, i.e., Byzantine, failures. Processes that respect the algorithm are correct. We assume correct processes communicate through authenticated links: prior to sending a message m to a correct process q, a correct process p signs m, labeled m σp , and q eventually delivers this message and can verify its authenticity. To simplify our presentation, we assume that the recipient process q knows the sender process p, i.e., the identity of sender p is implicit in message m; moreover, we omit the signed notation, and simply write m to mean a message signed by its sender p.
Processes are asynchronous: we make no assumptions on communication delays or process relative speeds. We assume, however, a global notion of time, outside the control of the processes, which we use to describe the events that occur to an external observer and prove the correctness of the protocol.
We consider a subset of U called the broadcast system. e composition of this set changes over time and we denote it by S(t), at time t. Processes in S(t) can broadcast and deliver messages in a reliable manner, according to properties we will describe below. We say that a process is a participant in the broadcast system, or simply participant, at time t, if it is part of S(t). If p / ∈S(t), we say that p is not a participant in the broadcast system at time t. We shall explain that in more details below.
Interface
e interface of our Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast ( ) consists of four primitives: 1. broadcast(m): allows a participant process s to disseminate message m within the broadcast system. 2. deliver(m): this callback triggers at participant p to handle the delivery of message m. 3. join(): a process p invokes this operation to become a participant in the broadcast system. When this invocation returns, we say p joined the system and this means p∈S(t).
Between the time p has invoked join() and has returned from the invocation, we say that p's join is pending. 4. leave(): a participant process p invokes this operation to leave the broadcast system. When process p returns from this invocation, we say that p left the system and p / ∈S(t). Between the time p invokes leave() and returns from that invocation, we say that p's leave is pending.
Assumptions
e following rules govern the behavior of correct processes. (i) A correct process s can invoke a broadcast(m) operation at time t only if s ∈ S(t). (ii) A correct process p can trigger a deliver(m) operation at time t only if p∈S(t). (iii) A correct process p can invoke a join() operation at time t only if p / ∈S(t). Moreover, we assume p invokes join() at most once. (iv) Finally, a correct process p can invoke a leave() operation at time t if p ∈ S(t). Moreover, we assume p invokes leave() at most once. We also make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Fault threshold). Let F (t) be the set of faulty participant processes at time t and L(t) be the set of pending leaves at t. At any time t, fewer than | S(t) 3 | processes out of S(t) can be in F (t)∪L(t). 2 Assumption 2 (Finite number of reconfiguration requests).
e number of processes that want to join or leave the system (in any execution) is finite. 1 Assumption 3. For presentation uniformity, we assume that initially, at time 0, the set S is not empty and the processes in S(0) have invoked and returned from a join() operation. Moreover, every process in the universe U knows S(0).
Properties
We now define the guarantees of our abstraction (definitions 1 and 2). For simplicity of presentation, we assume a specific instance of , i.e., with a predefined sender process s and one broadcast message.
Definition 1 (Basic guarantees).
• Validity. If a correct participant s broadcasts a message m, then every correct participant q eventually delivers m or process q leaves the system. • Totality. If a correct participant p delivers a message m, then every correct participant q eventually delivers m or process q leaves the system. • No duplication. No correct participant delivers more than one message. • Integrity. If some correct participant delivers a message m with sender s and s is correct, then s previously broadcast m. 2 • Consistency. If some correct participant delivers a message m and another correct participant delivers a message m , then m=m . • Join Safety. If a correct process p is a participant in the system at time t, then p has invoked a join() operation or p was a participant in the system at time t =0. • Leave Safety. If a correct process p is not a participant in the system at time t and p was a participant in the system at time t <t, then p has invoked a leave() operation. • Join Liveness. A correct process that has invoked a join() operation eventually joins the system. • Leave Liveness. A correct participant that has invoked a leave() operation eventually leaves the system.
It is important to notice that one could implement the properties above (Definition 1) rather trivially by instantiating a (static) Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive encompassing all processes in U, whether they are participants or not. Nothing prevents all processes from executing such a protocol. Of course, this would be against the idea of a dynamic system where only participants in the broadcast system execute the protocol. To capture this constraint, we introduce a non-triviality property that satisfies besides properties of Definition 1.
1 is is a standard assumption in the literature of dynamic systems ([1, 2] ), essential to guarantee liveness. It is shown in [3] that even a regular register can not be implemented if the system reconfigures infinitely often.
2 Recall that the identity of sender process s for a given message m is implicit in the message ( §2.1).
Definition 2 (Non-triviality). A correct process does not send any messages before invoking a join() operation and after returning from leave() operation.
Overview
Here we give an overview of two scenarios: (i) a (correct) process joining the system, and (ii) a (correct) process broadcasting a message in the system.
Joins
To initiate the protocol for joining the broadcast system, a correct process p invokes a join() operation. Upon doing so, p asks processes (in the universe) about the current membership of the broadcast system. ose in the broadcast system respond (as we explain in §4.1). Once p learns the set S of current participants in the system, p broadcasts a , +,p message to the participants. is triggers a three-step algorithm that processes in the system execute, as follows.
First, when any correct process q delivers the message from p, q proposes S to the current participants in the system (by broadcasting a message); S represents the current membership of the system with addition of the process p. is concludes the first step.
In the second step, q (and every other correct process) waits to collect a Byzantine quorum [20] (with respect to S) of matching messages. We say that processes in the system are trying to converge on a new membership. Once q collects these matching messages, process q broadcasts a , S message to the current participants in the system.
In the third step, each correct process q waits to gather messages from a Byzantine quorum (with respect to S) of processes. en, q reliably broadcasts an , S message to all processes from S ; recall that process p belongs to S . Upon delivering an message for S , process q considers now that the membership of the system has changed to S . e join() operation finishes at process p once this process delivers the message for S p. e purpose of , and messages is explained in details in §4.2, whereas the given overview is presented in Figure 1 .
Broadcast
A correct process s that wants to broadcast a message m at time t with guarantees specified by definitions 1 and 2, firstly broadcasts a message to every process that is a member of S(t). When a correct process q delivers the message for m, q sends an message to s that represents q's signed statement that s sent m to q. Once s collects a Byzantine quorum of appropriate messages for m, s includes collected signatures into a message certificate and injects a message certificate into a message sent to every process that is a member of S(t). When a correct process 3 q delivers a message with a valid message certificate (a Byzantine quorum of verified statements that m is sent by s) for m, q delivers m and confirms delivery of m by sending a message to s. Moreover, if the sender is malicious, it is impossible to ensure totality without taking one additional "all-to-all" communication step. Hence, q rebroadcasts a message to processes that are members of S(t). We explain the broadcast(m) and deliver(m) operations in details in §4.3, whereas the given overview is presented in Figure 2 .
e Algorithm
In this section we first describe some elementary building blocks we use to obtain an algorithm implementing ( §4.1). We then provide the full algorithm for implementing join and leave operations in ( §4.2), as well as the broadcast and delivery of messages ( §4.3).
Building Blocks
Change. We define change = {+,−}×U, where the tuple +,p (resp. −,p ) indicates that process p asked to join (resp. leave) the system.
View.
A view v is composed by a set of changes (represented by v.entries) and its associated membership (represented by v.members).
Consequently, v.members = {p ∈ U : +,p ∈ v.entries∧ −,p / ∈ v.entries}. For simplicity, we use p ∈ v and |v| meaning p ∈ v.members and |v.members|, respectively. Recall that we assume correct process p can join and leave the system only once.
We say that protocol message m sent during an execution of is associated with view v if the last argument of m is v. Besides that, we say that a view v is installed in the system if some correct process p∈v considers v as its current view and processes , and messages associated with this view (see § § 4.2 and 4.3). At any time t, we define V (t) to be the most up-to-date view installed in the system. We compare two views v 1 and v 2 by comparing their entries. We use the notation v 1 ⊂ v 2 and v 1 = v 2 as an abbreviation for v 1 .entries ⊂ v 2 .entries and v 1 .entries = v 2 .entries, respectively. If v 1 ⊂v 2 , then v 2 is more up-to-date than v 1 .
Finally: 3 • We denote by v.f the number of faulty processes that are members of view v. • For any view v, we assume |v|≥3v.f +1. Sequence of views. A sequence of views seq is a set of views with the additional property:
ere is a question that is naturally imposed in : How will the processes that want to join the system find out which processes they should "contact" in order to indeed join the system? More generally: How can processes discover which views are properly "instantiated" by during an execution? Suppose that a correct process p wants to join the system. In order to get the necessary approval that p can start participating in the system (broadcasting and delivering messages), p needs to communicate with processes that are currently in the system. How can p know who is in the system? When a correct process p wants to join the system, p broadcasts a message to the processes that are part of the most updated view (line 19 of Algorithm 1) p has "discovered" (line 18 of Algorithm 1). Process p continues discovering (by flooding a network asking for current views) new views installed in the system until p joins the system.
It is important to note that p can not be tricked by malicious processes that want to plant views not "instantiated" by our protocol. An message "dictates" reconfiguring from one view to another and it carries a proof of its authenticity (see §4.2). Processes will send all messages they have encountered to p and p "builds a chain" of properly installed views (starting from the initial view of the system) by collecting those messages. In this way, p gets bootstrap regarding the system membership.
If process p wants to leave, the situation is much simpler. If p does not deliver a Byzantine quorum of messages, p eventually delivers an message that enforces p to change its current view. At that point, p rebroadcasts a message to processes that are members of the new view.
Finally, by "building a chain" of properly installed views, a joining process p knows exactly which views are properly "instantiated" by . us, if p delivers a message m with a message certificate collected in some view v (see §4.3), it can verify whether v is properly installed in the system. If it is, p can safely deliver m.
Dynamicity
Algorithms 1 and 2 present the pseudocode of the join() and leave() operations.
When a correct process p invokes a join() operation (specified by the interface of our broadcast system), the algorithm creates a m join = , +,p ,cv message (note that cv is a local variable of p that represents p's current view of the system) and sends m join to every process that is a member of cv (line 19 of Algorithm 1). Process p then waits for cv.q messages (line 17 of Algorithm 1). If p does not collect a Byzantine quorum of message, it eventually discovers that some more updated view v is properly installed in the system (line 18 of Algorithm 1) and sends a m join = , +,p ,v message to processes that are members of v (line 19 of Algorithm 1). Process p repeats this until it receives a Byzantine quorum of messages or event join completed occurs.
When a correct process r ∈ cv delivers m join from p, r checks whether its current view is equal to cv, adds +,p to its set of pending reconfiguration requests (local variable RECV ; line 33 of Algorithm 1) and sends a message to p (line 34 of Algorithm 1). After some timeout, process r proposes a new view v = cv ∪RECV by sending a message to every process that is a member of cv (line 40 of Algorithm 1). It is important to observe that messages carry signed messages for changes they propose (important for ensuring join and leave safety; we omit this in algorithms 1 and 2). Note that scenario when some correct process p wants to leave the system is completely equivalent, except that p broadcasts a message with −,p as an argument and r adds −,p to its set of pending reconfiguration requests.
Process r delivers messages 4 from other processes and updates its proposal (local variable SEQ) according to two cases:
1. ere are conflicting views 5 in r's and delivered proposal (line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): In this case, r creates a new proposal containing r's last converged sequence (local variable LCSEQ) and a new view representing the union of the most up-to-date views of two proposals. 2.
ere are not conflicting views in r's and delivered proposal (line 49 of Algorithm 1): In this case, r executes the union of its previous and delivered proposal in order to create a new proposal. When r receives the same proposal from a Byzantine quorum of processes, r stores the value of SEQ variable in LCSEQ variable (line 53 of Algorithm 1) and broadcasts a message with SEQ as an argument (line 54 of Algorithm 1).
When r delivers a message for some sequence of views seq and some view v (usually v is equal to the current view of process r) from a Byzantine quorum of processes that are members of view v (line 56 of Algorithm 1), r creates and reliably disseminates an message that specifies the view that should be replaced (i.e., v), the least up-to-date view of the sequence seq denoted by ω (line 57 of Algorithm 1) and the entire sequence seq (line 58 of Algorithm 1). An message is sent to processes that are members of views v 4 Correct process p accepts a sequence of views seq (see §5.1) if seq ∈ F ORMAT or ∅∈F ORMAT (line 42 of Algorithm 1). e following holds at every correct process that is a member of the initial view v 0 : ∅∈F ORMAT v 0 . 5 Different views v and v are conflicting if v ⊂v ∧v ⊃v .
and ω (line 58 of Algorithm 1). Note that messages include a Byzantine quorum of signed messages which ensures its authenticity, i.e., that the message is properly "instantiated" by protocol (we omit this in algorithms 1 and 2 for brevity). Lastly, since messages carry a proof of authenticity, reliable broadcast can be implemented by a simple retransmission by the receiving side before the delivery.
When a correct process r delivers an message (line 1 of Algorithm 2), r enters the reconfiguration procedure in order to update its current view of the system. ere are three main parts of the reconfiguration procedure:
1. Process r was a member of a view v and ω is more up-to-date than its current view cv (lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 2): If this is the case, r stops processing , and messages (line 5 of Algorithm 2; see §4.3). Hence, this is the point in the execution of r when it is clear which messages r has acknowledged (sent message for) and delivered. is is important because r needs to send to members of a new view which messages r has acknowledged and delivered (which represents the state of process r) and therefore, we must avoid any ambiguity, as we explain in §4.3. 2. Process r is a member of ω ⊃ cv (line 9 to line 24 of Algorithm 2): In this case, r waits for v.q of messages (line 9 of Algorithm 2), updates its current view (line 13 of Algorithm 2), processes received states (line 14 of Algorithm 2) and sends messages to processes that were part of v, but are not part of ω (i.e., processes that want to leave; line 16 of Algorithm 2). 3. Process r is not a member of ω ⊃ cv (lines 26 and 27 of Algorithm 2): In this case, r waits for ω.q messages (line 26 of Algorithm 2) and leaves the system (line 27 of Algorithm 2). is is important to ensure that a correct leaving process will participate in the reconfiguration protocol that installs a new view without itself, i.e., a correct leaving process stays available to transfer its state.
Broadcast
In order to disseminate some message m with properties presented in definitions 1 and 2, processes that are participants in use the following types of messages: 1.
: When a correct process s invokes a broadcast(m) operation, the algorithm creates a m prepare = , m,cv s message, where cv s is the current view of the system of process s. Message m prepare is sent to every process that is a member of cv s (line 27 of Algorithm 3). Process s broadcasts a message if cv s is installed by s; otherwise, s waits to install some view and then broadcasts a message.
2.
: When a correct process q delivers m prepare message, it firstly checks whether view specified in m prepare is equal to the current view of q (line 29 of Algorithm 3). If that is the case, q checks whether it is allowed to send an message for m (see Ensuring consistency paragraph; line 30 of Algorithm 3) and if it is, q sends m ack = , m,σ,cv q message to process s (i.e., the sender of m join ), where σ represents the signed statement that s sent m to q (line 31 of Algorithm 3). When some process q sends an message for m (m is a second argument of the message), we say that q acknowledges m. Moreover, if the message is associated with some view v, we say that q acknowledges m in a view v.
3.
: When process s delivers a Byzantine quorum of appropriate messages associated with the same view v for m (line 37 of Algorithm 3), it collects received signed statements into a message certificate. Process s then creates m commit = , m,cer,v cer ,cv s message and broadcasts m commit to every process that is a member of cv s (line 39 of Algorithm 3). Note that cv s may be different than v (we account for this in the rest of the section). Moreover, s broadcasts a message (line 39 of Algorithm 3) if cv s is installed by s; otherwise, s waits to install some view and then broadcasts a message. 4.
: When a correct process q delivers m commit message, it firstly checks whether view specified in m commit is equal to the current view of q (line 41 of Algorithm 3). If that is the case and the message certificate is valid (line 42 of Algorithm 3), q delivers m and sends m con−commit = , m,cv q to process s (i.e., the sender of m commit ; line 47 of Algorithm 3). Observe that q also relays m commit in order to ensure totality if the sender of m is malicious (lines 24 and 46 of Algorithm 3). As it can be seen above, every , , and message is associated with one specific view. We can divide the broadcasting of message m by the correct sender s into two phases:
1. Certificate collection phase: is phase includes broadcasting of an appropriate message and waiting for a Byzantine quorum of messages by process s. Note that and messages are associated with the same view v. We say that certificate collection phase is executed in view v. Moreover, if s indeed delivers a Byzantine quorum of messages, we say that certificate collection phase is successfully executed in v. In that case, sometimes we say that s collects a message certificate in v.
Delivery phase:
is phase includes broadcasting of a message that contains a valid message certificate collected in the previous phase and waiting for a Byzantine quorum of messages by process s. Note that and messages are associated with the same view v. We say that delivery phase is executed in view v. Moreover, if s indeed delivers a Byzantine quorum of messages, we say that delivery phase is successfully executed in v. Observe that the certificate collection phase can be successfully executed in some view v, whereas the delivery phase can be executed in some view v ⊃ v. is is the reason why we 6 Algorithm 1 algorithm for join() and leave() operations. Code for process p. cv =v 0 current view of the system; v 0 is the initial view of the system 11:
RECV =∅ set of pending join and leave requests 12:
SEQ v =∅ proposed sequence of views to replace view v; for every view v 13:
LCSEQ v =∅ last converged sequence of views to replace view v; for every view v 14: 
Algorithm 2 algorithm for installing a view. Code for process p.
if p∈v then p was a member of v 4:
if cv ⊂ω then p's current view is less updated than ω 5:
stop processing , and messages 6:
∀k ∈ω,send , State,RECV to k 7:
if cv ⊂ω then ω is more updated than p's current view 8:
if p∈ω then p is in ω 9:
wait for , * , * messages from v.q processes in v 10: req = {reconfiguration requests from messages} 11:
RECV =RECV ∪req\ω.entries 12:
states={states from messages} 13:
cv =ω 14:
trigger state-transfer(states) Algorithm 3 15:
if p / ∈v then join completed can return from join() 16:
∀k ∈v\cv,send , cv to k 17:
if ∃ω ∈seq :cv ⊂ω then 18:
seq ={ω ∈seq :cv ⊂ω } 19:
if SEQ cv =∅∧∀ω ∈seq :cv ⊂ω then 20:
SEQ cv =seq 21:
∀k ∈cv,send , SEQ cv ,cv to k 22: else 23:
resume processing , and messages and start a timer for cv 24:
trigger new-view() Algorithm 3 25: else p is leaving the system 26:
wait for , ω messages from ω.q processes in ω 27:
leave completed can return from leave() 28: need to include v cer argument in a message, which represents the view in which message certificate is collected.
Example of an execution. Consider four processes in the system at time t = 0. Moreover, process p 1 broadcasts a message m. Hence, p 1 sends to processes p 1 , p 2 ,
Since all processes consider v 0 as their current view of the system at time of delivering of m prepare message, they send to p 1 an appropriate message and p 1 collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to v 0 ) of messages for m. However, process p 5 invokes a join() operation and processes p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 set v 1 = { +, p 1 , +, p 2 , +, p 3 , +, p 4 , +, p 5 } as their current view of the system. Process p 1 still considers v 0 as its current view of the system and broadcasts a m commit = , m,cer,v cer =v 0 ,v 0 message. Processes p 2 , p 3 and p 4 do not deliver m, since v 0 (specified in m commit message) is not their current view. Observe that p 1 delivers m since v 0 is still the current view of the system from p 1 's perspective.
Once process p 1 assigns v 1 as its current view of the system, it broadcasts m commit = , m,cer,v cer =v 0 ,v 1 message to processes that are members of v 1 and they all deliver m. In this execution p 1 has successfully executed a certificate collection phase in v 0 and then reused the message certificate to relay an appropriate message to processes that are members of v 1 (since the system reconfigured to v 1 ). Figure 3 depicts the described execution.
Ensuring validity. A correct process s that broadcasts a message m must successfully execute certificate collection and delivery phases in order to ensure validity.
Process s does not leave the system before s has ensured validity for m that s previously broadcast (line 25 of Algorithm 1). Recall that we assume a finite number of reconfiguration requests (Assumption 2), which means that there exists a view v final from which system will not be reconfigured (we prove this in §5.2).
A correct process s that broadcasts a message m executes a certificate collection phase in some view v (the current view of s). Even if s does not successfully execute a certificate collection phase in views that precede v final in the sequence of installed views (we prove that installed views in the system form a sequence in §5.2), s successfully executes a certificate collection phase in v final .
Consider a scenario where a correct process s wants to leave the system, but s did not previously ensure validity for m. Hence, s can not collect a message certificate in v final , because s / ∈ v final . However, it is guaranteed that s will collect a message certificate in a view v final at last, where v final includes every possible reconfiguration request that can be proposed in the execution, except −,s . Lastly, note that there can be processes other than s that did not ensure validity for some of their messages (in a more general version of where multiple processes can broadcast multiple messages). We can apply the same reasoning and show that eventually every correct process ensures validity for each message previously broadcast (proven in §5.4).
Observe that if at least a Byzantine quorum of processes 8 that are members of some installed view v deliver a message m, then every correct process p∈v , where view v ⊃v is installed, delivers m. Let us give an intuition behind this claim.
Suppose that view v directly succeeds view v in the sequence of views installed in the system. Process p ∈ v waits for states from at least a Byzantine quorum of processes that were members of v before it updates its current view to v (line 9 of Algorithm 2 and line 13 of Algorithm 3). Hence, p receives from at least one process that m is delivered and then p delivers m.
A correct process q that delivers a message for m checks whether aforementioned message is associated with a view equal to its current view of the system. If this is the case, it sends a message to a sender which represents a confirmation that q has delivered m. When a sender collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to some installed view) of confirmations that a message is indeed delivered, it can stop rebroadcasting m in subsequent views because of the previous argument. Even if a correct sender does not collect a quorum of messages in views that precede v final , it must collect the quorum when rebroadcasting in v final (or v final as explained above).
Suppose that the sender collects an aforementioned quorum of messages in some installed view v. If v =v final , every correct member of v final delivers m (because of the previous argument). If v =v final , reliable links and the fact that the system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every correct member of v final delivers m. Hence, validity is ensured.
Ensuring totality.
e intuition behind ensuring totality of is similar to the logic behind ensuring validity. Suppose that a correct process p delivers a message m. In order to ensure totality, p must relay message m (lines 24 and 46 of Algorithm 3) until p collects a quorum of messages from processes that are members of some installed view v. If v =v final , every correct member of v final delivers m (because of the argument we made in the previous paragraph).
If v =v final , reliable links and fact that the system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every correct member of v final delivers m. Hence, totality is ensured.
Ensuring consistency. Suppose that process s has successfully executed a certificate collection phase in some view v for some message m. Because of the quorum intersection and the verification at line 30 of Algorithm 3, it is impossible for s to collect a valid message certificate in v for some message m =m.
However, it is possible for s to collect a message certificate for m in some view v ⊃v. Assume that all processes that are members of v later consider a view v as their current view of the system. Malicious sender s now broadcasts a message m = m and it is possible that new processes, which are not aware of the fact that s broadcast m previously, acknowledge m (send an message associated with v for m). us, s can collect a message certificate again, but now for m . is implies that consistency can be violated. e reasoning behind our strategy to deal with the depicted scenario starts with the fact that the existence of a message certificate for m implies that at least a Byzantine quorum of processes that are members of some view have sent an message associated with that view for m.
Let us analyse again the presented example which shows how a malicious sender can collect message certificates for m and m . Suppose that there is a correct process p, such that p∈v ∧p / ∈v (i.e., p has just joined the system). Clearly, p can be a process that malicious sender s targets in order to equivocate since p is not aware that s broadcast message m previously. Since s has collected a message certificate for m in v, at least a quorum of 9 processes in v have acknowledged m. Moreover, reconfiguration protocol ensures that p receives from at least one correct process q that q has acknowledged m (because of the quorum intersection; line 9 of Algorithm 2 and line 14 of Algorithm 3). Finally, in order to prevent a potential equivocation, if p receives a message for some message m from process s, p sends an message only if m =m (line 30 of Algorithm 3).
Proof of Correctness

Preliminary Definitions
Definition 3. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v broadcasts a , seq,v message at line 40 of Algorithm 1 or at line 21 of Algorithm 2. We say that p proposes a sequence of views seq to replace a view v.
Definition 4. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to v) of , seq,v messages (line 56 of Algorithm 1). We say that p converges on a sequence of views seq to replace a view v.
Definition 5. We say that a sequence of views seq is converged on to replace a view v if some (correct or faulty) process p ∈ v collects a Byzantine quorum (with respect to v) of , seq,v messages.
Definition 6. Suppose that seq ∈ F ORMAT v at a correct process p for some view v p. We say that p accepts a sequence of views seq to replace a view v. Moreover, if ∅ ∈ F ORMAT v , then p accepts any sequence to replace v.
Definition 7. We say that a sequence of views seq is accepted to replace a view v if some correct process p ∈ v accepts seq to replace v.
We prove in §5.2 that if seq is converged on or a correct process proposes seq to replace some view, then seq is a sequence of views. Finally, if seq is accepted to replace some view, then seq is a sequence of views.
Preliminary Lemmata
Definition 8. We say that view v is valid if one of the following holds:
• View v is the initial view of the system; or
is converged on to replace some valid view v . Otherwise, we say that view v is invalid. e assumptions regarding the quorum size and number of faulty processes in a view (see §4.1) apply only to valid views, i.e., only valid views need to satisfy the aforementioned assumptions. Moreover, correct processes process , and messages only if they are associated with valid views. Lastly, a correct process p delivers some message m which Algorithm 3 algorithm for broadcast(m) and deliver(m) operations. Code for process p. p is allowed to acknowledge any m 11: 12: procedure state-transfer(states) 13:
(1) p delivers m if p has not delivered any message and some process q claims that it has delivered m with a valid message certificate 14:
(2) p is allowed to acknowledge m if only m is acknowledged by processes that have sent their state 15:
(3) p is not allowed to acknowledge any message if some process q has acknowledged m and some process r m 16:
(4) p is not allowed to acknowledge any message if some process q claims that p should not acknowledge any message and provides p with two different messages s broadcast 17 message certificate is collected in some view v once p "discovers" that view v is valid (Lemma 21 proves that v is installed).
Lemma 1. Suppose that seq is converged on to replace some valid view v. en, seq is a sequence of views, i.e., the following holds:
Proof. Since seq is converged on, a correct process p ∈ v sent a message with seq. e value of SEQ v variable is sent inside of a message. Suppose that the value of SEQ v is a sequence of views. We analyze two possible ways for modifying the SEQ v variable of p:
• ere are no conflicting views upon delivering a message (line 49 of Algorithm 1): New value of SEQ v is a sequence of views because of the fact that there are no conflicting views and both value of SEQ v and sequence received in a message (because of the verification at line 43 of Algorithm 1) are sequences of views. • ere are conflicting views upon delivering a message (line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): Suppose that p has delivered a message with seq . Because of the verification at line 43 of Algorithm 1, seq is a sequence of views. Moreover, LCSEQ v variable of p is either SEQ v or a subset of SEQ v . After executing line 47 of Algorithm 1, the union of two most updated views results in a view with greater cardinality than the "last" view of LCSEQ v and LCSEQ v is a sequence of views (or LCSEQ v =∅). Hence, value of SEQ v variable is a sequence of views. A set with just one view is, trivially, a sequence of views. We proved that two sequences of views "produce" a sequence of views which ensures that lemma holds.
Lemma 1 proves that if seq is converged on to replace some valid view v, then seq is a sequence of views. Moreover, since a set with a single view is a sequence of views and a correct process proposes seq to replace some valid view at line 40 of Algorithm 1 or at line 21 of Algorithm 2, proposed seq is a sequence of views. Similarly, if seq is accepted to replace some valid view, then seq is a sequence of views.
Lemma 2. Suppose that sequences of views seq 1 and seq 2 are converged on to replace some valid view v.
en, either seq 1 ⊆seq 2 or seq 1 ⊃seq 2 .
Proof. Suppose that some process p ∈ v has collected a Byzantine quorum of messages for seq 1 to replace a view v. Moreover, suppose that process q ∈v has collected a Byzantine quorum of messages for seq 2 to replace v. is means that there is at least one correct process k ∈v that has sent message both for seq 1 and seq 2 . Suppose that k first sent message for seq 1 and seq 1 =seq 2 . At the moment of sending of a message for seq 1 (line 54 of Algorithm 1), the following holds for k's local variables: LCSEQ v = seq 1 and SEQ v = seq 1 . On the other hand, SEQ v = seq 2 when k sent a message for seq 2 . us, we need to prove that SEQ v includes seq 1 from the moment k has sent a message for seq 1 . ere are two ways for modifying SEQ v local variable: • Process k receives a message for some sequence of views seq and there are no conflicting views in SEQ v and seq (line 49 of Algorithm 1): Since SEQ v contains seq 1 and the simple union is performed, the resulting sequence of views contains seq 1 . • Process k receives a message for some sequence of views seq and there are conflicting views in SEQ v and seq (line 45 to line 47 of Algorithm 1): Since LCSEQ v contains seq 1 and LCSEQ v participates in the union, the resulting sequence of views contains seq 1 . We proved that SEQ v always contains seq 1 after message for seq 1 is sent. Consequently, the following holds: seq 1 ⊂seq 2 .
Using similar arguments, it is possible to prove the symmetrical execution: if process k sent message for seq 2 and then for seq 1 , we have that seq 1 ⊃seq 2 . Lastly, processes could have collected the messages for the same sequence and then we have seq 1 =seq 2 .
Lemma 3. Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged on to replace some valid view v.
en, the following holds: ∀ω ∈seq :v ⊂ω.
Proof. Lemma holds because of the verifications at lines 38 and 43 of Algorithm 1 and at line 19 of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a correct process p ∈ v proposes a sequence of views seq p to replace some valid view v. en, p eventually converges on a sequence of views seq p to replace v.
Proof. When p proposes seq p to replace v, p broadcasts a , seq p ,v message. Since we assume reliable links for communication between processes, messages sent by correct processes are received by correct processes. For process p to converge on a sequence of views seq p to replace v, at least v.q processes should send a message for seq p . During this period, p changes the value of its variable SEQ v with sequences of views received from other processes. Since there are at least v.q correct processes in v and a finite number of reconfiguration requests (i.e., even a malicious process can not propose new views an infinite number of times; Assumption 2), at least v.q processes are going to send a message for the same sequence. Hence, p eventually converges on seq p to replace a view v.
Lemma 5. Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged on to replace some valid view v. en, seq is accepted to replace v.
Proof. Suppose that seq is converged on to replace v.
is implies that at least v.q processes have sent a message with seq as an argument. ere is a correct process p∈v that has sent an aforementioned message. Hence, p accepts seq (before sending a proposal, p executes line 2 of Algorithm 2 or v is the initial view of the system) and lemma holds.
Definition 9. We say that a valid view v is installable if one of the following holds:
• View v is the initial view of the system; or • Some sequence of views seq = v (a sequence of views with just view v) is converged on to replace some valid view v . Otherwise, we say that view v is not installable. Lemma 6. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. If sequence of views seq = v 1 → ... → v n ,(n ≥ 1) is converged on to replace v, then a sequence of views seq = v → v 1 → ... → v n is converged on to replace some valid view v .
Proof. Lemma 5 shows that seq is accepted to replace v. Hence, some correct process p executed line 2 of Algorithm 2 upon delivering an message associated with some valid view v and with some sequence seq . Because of the fact that v is not installable and seq \{v}=seq (line 2 of Algorithm 2) and v ⊂ v 1 (Lemma 3), we conclude that seq = v → v 1 → ... → v n . Hence, lemma holds.
Lemma 7. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. If sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v n ,(n≥1) is converged on to replace v, then a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v m →v → v 1 →...→v n ,(m≥0) is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,...,v m are not installable.
Proof. A sequence of views seq
Suppose that v is not installable. Because of the fact that v is valid and Lemma 6, we can conclude that a sequence of views seq =v →v →v 1 →...→v n is converged on to replace some valid view v . Again, if v is installable, then lemma holds.
We can apply the same argument a finite number of times. is is due to the fact that the initial view of the system is installable and unique and there is a finite number of processes invoking join() and leave() operations in any execution (Assumption 2). Hence, lemma holds.
Lemma 8. Consider an installable view v different than the initial view of the system. en, a sequence of views seq =v 1 →v 2 →...→v n →v,(n≥0) is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,v 2 ,...,v n are not installable.
Proof. A sequence of views seq =v is converged on to replace some valid view v (Definition 9). If v is installable, then lemma holds.
Suppose that v is not installable. Lemma 7 proves that a sequence of views seq
is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,...,v m are not installable. Hence, lemma holds.
Definition 10. Consider views v and v installable in the system. Suppose that a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v n →v ,(n≥0) is converged on to replace v and views v 1 ,...,v n are not installable. We say that v leads to v . Proof. Because of the Definition 10, sequences of views seq = ... → v and seq = ... → v are converged on to replace v. Lemma 2 ensures that the following holds: seq ⊆seq or seq ⊃ seq . Suppose that v =v and let us analyze two possible cases:
• seq =seq : In this case, v =v and lemma holds.
• seq = seq : Without loss of generality, we suppose that v ⊂v . en we have two cases: -seq ⊂ seq : In this case, we can conclude that v ∈ seq . Hence, Definition 10 is not satisfied for v since v is installable. erefore, v leads only to v and lemma holds. -seq ⊃ seq : We can conclude that v ∈ seq and v ⊂v (since v is the "last" view of seq ). is is conflicting with the fact that v ⊂v . us, lemma holds.
Lemma 10. Consider an installable view v. If v leads to v and v leads to v, then v =v .
Proof. Suppose that v =v . Suppose that some view v p1 leads to v and v p2 leads to v . If v p1 = v p2 , then this view leads to two different views, which is a contradiction with Lemma 9. Hence, lemma holds.
If v p1 =v p2 , we can consider views that lead to v p1 and v p2 and apply the same argument. Because of the fact the initial view of the system is installable and unique, we can conclude that there exists an installable view that leads to two different views.
is contradicts Lemma 9, which implies that lemma holds.
Lemma 11. Consider an installable view v that leads to v . Suppose that a sequence of views seq is converged on to replace v, then v ∈seq.
Proof. Some sequence of views seq = ... → v is converged on to replace v (Definition 10). Now, some sequence seq is converged on to replace v. Lemma 2 ensures that seq ⊃ seq . Hence, v ∈seq.
Lemma 12. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. en, a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v m →v →v 1 →...→ v n ,(m≥0,n≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,...,v m are not installable.
is converged on to replace some valid view v (definitions 8 and 9). If v is installable, then lemma holds.
Lemma 13. Consider a valid view v which is not installable. Suppose that a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v k →v →...→ v n ,(k ≥0,n≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view v and a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v j →v →...→v m ,(j ≥ 0,m≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,...,v k and v 1 ,...,v j are not installable. en, v =v .
Proof. Suppose that v = v . Let us say that some view v p1 leads to v and that some view v p2 leads to v (Lemma 10). If v p1 = v p2 , then this view leads to two different views, which is a contradiction with Lemma 9. Hence, lemma holds.
If v p1 =v p2 , we can consider views that lead to v p1 and v p2 and apply the same argument. Because of the fact the initial view of the system is installable and unique, we can conclude that there exists an installable view such that it leads to two different views. is contradicts Lemma 9, which implies that lemma holds.
Definition 11. Consider a valid view v which is not installable.
Suppose that a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v m →v →v 1 →...→v n ,(m≥0,n≥1) is converged on to replace some installable view v and views v 1 ,...,v m are not installable. We say that v is an auxiliary view for v .
Lemma 14. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view for v and v . en, v =v .
Proof.
is follows directly from Lemma 13 and Definition 11.
Lemma 15. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view for v . If a sequence of views seq = v 1 → ... → v n , (n ≥ 1) is converged on to replace v, then a sequence of views seq =v 1 →...→v m →v →v 1 →...→v n ,(m≥0) is converged on to replace v and views v 1 ,...,v m are not installable.
is follows directly from Lemma 7 and Definition 11.
Lemma 16. Consider a view v which is an auxiliary view for v . Suppose that v leads to v . If sequence of views seq = v 1 → ...→v n ,(n≥1) is converged on to replace v, then v ∈seq.
Proof. Lemma 15 shows that some sequence of views
e fact that v ⊃v ensures that v ∈seq.
Lemma 9 proves that an installable view v can lead only to one view v because some sequence of views seq = ... → v is converged on to replace v. Moreover, consider a case when two sequences of views seq 1 and seq 2 are converged on to replace a view v. en, Lemma 2 shows that seq 1 ⊆seq 2 or seq 1 ⊃seq 2 .
is implies that if some sequence of views seq = ... → v is converged on to replace v, then v ∈seq (proven by Lemma 11).
Consider the following example. Suppose that the initial view of the system v 0 leads to v 1 which leads to v 2 (Figure 4 depicts this scenario). A sequence of views seq =...→v 1 is converged on to replace v 0 (Definition 10). Besides that, a sequence of views seq = ... → v 2 is converged on to replace v 1 (Definition 10).
Suppose now that a sequence of views seq = ... → v 3 is converged on to replace v 0 . Lemma 11 shows that v 1 ∈seq . Hence, some sequence of views seq with v 3 must be converged on to replace v 1 in order for v 3 to be installable (line 21 of Algorithm 2). However, Lemma 11 then ensures that seq contains v 2 .
Finally, Lemma 16 ensures that sequences of views converged on to replace some view v a which is an auxiliary view for v 0 must include v 1 . us, it is guaranteed that installable views will form a sequence.
In conclusion, Lemma 11 proves that if some sequence of views seq is converged on to replace an installable view v which leads to v , then v ∈seq. Informally, this implies that v plays its role in processing seq (line 21 of Algorithm 2) which is sufficient to ensure that no branching with respect to views will ever happen (because of Lemma 2). Lemma 16 proves the same point, just from the perspective of an auxiliary (not installable) view. Lemma 17. e installable views in the system form a sequence.
Proof. Suppose that a view ω 1 is an installable view. View ω 1 leads to some view ω 2 (Lemma 9). e same argument can be applied inductively to any number of views, and thus it is possible to see that the installable views in the system form a sequence ω 1 →ω 2 →...→ω k−1 →ω k .
Lemma 18. e views installed in the system form a sequence.
is lemma follows directly from the fact that the set of installed views is a subset of the set of installable views and Lemma 17.
Lemma 19. e reconfiguration of the system eventually finishes.
Proof. System starts from the initial view v 0 . e system reconfiguration starts when some sequence of views to replace v 0 is converged on. System reconfigures to some view v 1 ⊃v 0 . Again, new sequences are proposed to replace v 1 which leads to a convergence on some sequence to replace v 1 . However, there will be some view v final such that no proposal to replace v final will be issued since RECV = ∅ in all processes that are members of v final (Assumption 2). At this point, the reconfiguration of the system is finished.
Dynamicity
Recall that the set of installed views is a subset of the set of installable views. Hence, if view v is installed, then v is installable. We say that V (t) is the most up-to-date view installed in the system.
Lemma 20. Suppose that a correct process p invokes a join()/leave() operation at time t, by broadcasting a message to processes that are members of V (t). Moreover, suppose that p receives V (t).q messages. en, there will be a view V (t > t), such that V (t) = V (t ), where +,p / −,p ∈V (t ).
Proof. Let us say that a correct process p broadcasts a m join = , +,p ,cv message, where cv = V (t), to processes that are members of V (t) at time t. Two cases are possible:
1. All correct processes in V (t) propose a sequence of views with a view that contains c = +,p to replace V (t). In this case, the fact that all proposed sequences of correct processes include a view with change c ensures that there will be a view V (t ), such that t >t∧V (t ) =V (t), where c∈V (t ). 2. Some correct processes in V (t) propose a sequence, before the receipt of m join , with a view that does not contain c. In this case, considering a time t > t when there is a new view V (t ) installed, two scenarios are possible: (a) c ∈ V (t ): since the proposed sequences from processes that received m join and proposed a view with c were computed in V (t ). (b) c ∈ V (t ): however, c was sent to all processes that are members of V (t ) (line 11 of Algorithm 2) that will propose a sequence that contains a view v , such that c ∈ v , to replace V (t ), reducing this situation to the first case. Clearly, the same argument can be made when a correct process p wants to leave the system. erefore, in any case there will be a view V (t ), such that V (t ) = V (t) ∧ t > t, where +,p / −,p ∈V (t ).
eorem 1 (Join Liveness). A correct process that has invoked a join() operation eventually joins the system.
Proof. Suppose that a correct process p executes a join() operation at time t, by sending a m join = , +,p ,cv =V (t) message to processes that are members of V (t) and receives V (t).q messages. Lemma 20 claims that there will be a view V (t ), such that V (t ) = V (t)∧t > t, where +,p ∈ V (t ). Consequently, when V (t ) is installed at process p, the join of process p is completed. eorem 2 (Leave Liveness). A correct participant that has invoked a leave() operation eventually leaves the system.
Proof. Suppose that a correct participant p executes a leave() operation at time t, by sending a m leave = , −,p ,cv =V (t) message to processes that are members of V (t) and receives V (t).q messages. Lemma 20 claims that there will be a view V (t ), such that V (t ) = V (t)∧t > t, where −,p ∈ V (t ). Consequently, when V (t ) is installed in the system, process p delivers messages and leaves the system. eorem 3 (Join Safety). If a correct process p is a participant in the system at time t, then p has invoked a join() operation or p was a participant in the system at time t =0.
Proof. Since process p is a participant in the system at time t, there must be a view v p installed in the system. is implies that some process z proposed a sequence of views containing view v such that +, p ∈ v .entries to replace some view pv ⊂v. Since processes do not process messages that contain a view with +,p without a signed message from process p (which we omit in Algorithm 1 for brevity), p must have invoked a join() operation.
If that is not the case, then p must have been a member of the initial view (i.e., a participant in the system at time t =0). eorem 4 (Leave Safety). If a correct process p is not a participant in the system at time t and p was a participant in the system at time t <t, then p has invoked a leave() operation.
Proof. Since process p is not a participant in the system at time t, there must be a view v p installed in the system. is implies that some process z proposed a sequence of views containing view v such that −, p ∈ v .entries to replace some view pv ⊂v (because p was a participant in the system). Since processes do not process messages that contain a view with −,p without a signed message from process p (which we omit in Algorithm 1 for brevity), p must have invoked a leave() operation.
Broadcast
Definition 12. Suppose that sender s of the message m delivers v.q , m,σ,v messages for some valid view v (line 37 of Algorithm 3). We say that s collects a message certificate for m in v.
Lemma 21. Suppose that some (correct or faulty) process s collects a message certificate for a message m in some valid view v. en, v is installed in the system.
Proof. Since s delivers v.q messages associated with v for m, a correct process p∈v sent an message associated with v for m to s. Because of the fact that p processes a message associated with view v only if v is installed by p, lemma holds.
Lemma 22. If message m is delivered by a correct process q, then the sender s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v.
Proof. Process q verifies the message certificate for m (lines 13 and 42 of Algorithm 3) prior to delivering m. Hence, s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v (Lemma 21).
Lemma 23. Suppose that view v is the most up-to-date view installed in the system at time t, i.e., V (t) = v. If process s broadcasts a message m at time t, then s can not collect a message certificate for m in some view v ⊂v.
Proof. Note that in order for s to collect a message certificate for m in some view v , v must be installed in the system and s must send a m prepare = , m,v message to processes that are members of v (line 27 of Algorithm 3). A correct process q sends an appropriate message for m prepare only if v is the current view of q and q processes messages associated with v .
Let us say that there is a correct process z that considers v = V (t) as its current view at time t and processes , and messages (i.e., v = V (t) is installed by z). Without loss of generality, consider that v is a view immediately before v in the sequence of installed views (Lemma 18). Consequently, at least v .q processes that are members of v stopped processing messages associated with v (line 5 of Algorithm 2).
[1] Suppose that s has collected a message certificate in v . at means that at least v .q processes have sent an message when they have received a , m,v message.
[2] From [1] and [2], we can conclude that at least one correct process has firstly stopped processing messages associated with v and then processed a message associated with v . is is conflicting with the behaviour of a correct process. Hence, process s can not collect a valid message certificate for m in v . eorem 5 (No duplication). No correct participant delivers more than one message.
Proof. e verifications at lines 13 and 43 of Algorithm 3 ensure that no message is delivered more than once. eorem 6 (Integrity). If some correct participant delivers a message m with sender s and s is correct, then s previously broadcast m.
Proof. Suppose that a correct participant q delivers a message m. at means that there is a message certificate for m collected in some installed view v by s (Lemma 22). A message certificate for m is collected since a quorum of processes in v have sent an appropriate message for m. A correct process sends an message only when it receives an appropriate message. Consequently, message m was broadcast by s.
Lemma 24. Suppose that process s has collected a message certificate for a message m in some installed view v. If s has also collected a message certificate for a message m in v, then m=m .
Proof. Because of the quorum intersection, there is at least one correct process that has sent an message for both m and m . e verification at line 30 of Algorithm 3 prevents a correct process from sending more than one message associated with some view v. Hence, Lemma 24 holds.
Lemma 25. Suppose that process s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v. Moreover, suppose that s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v ⊃v. en, m=m .
Proof. Since s has collected a message certificate for m in v, at least v.q processes have acknowledged m by sending an appropriate message associated with v to s (line 31 of Algorithm 3).
In order to prove Lemma 25, it is enough to prove that every correct process q that is member of a view v ⊃ v will send an message associated with v for m only if m =m. We prove this by induction.
Base
Step: Suppose that v is an installed view which directly succeeds view v in the sequence of installed views (Lemma 18). Every correct process q ∈v receives from at least one process z ∈ v that z has acknowledged m in v (line 9 of Algorithm 2 and line 14 of Algorithm 3). Hence, every correct process q ∈v knows that it is allowed to send an message associated with v for m only if m =m (line 30 of Algorithm 3). Note that there might be some auxiliary views "between" v and v . However, outcome is the same: every correct process that is a member of v "discovers" that m was acknowledged in the past and sends an message associated with v for m only if m =m. Induction Step: ere is an installed view v such that every correct process q ∈ v knows that it can send an message associated with v for m only if m =m. We should prove that every correct process r ∈ v , such that v is an installed view that directly succeeds view v , will know that it is allowed to send an message associated with v for m only if m =m. Process r receives from at least one process in v (line 9 of Algorithm 2 and line 14 of Algorithm 3) that r is allowed to send an message associated with v for m only if m =m. us, r "discovers" that message m has been acknowledged in some view that precedes v . erefore, every correct process p ∈ v , where view v ⊃ v is installed, acknowledges a message m in v if m = m. Consequently, if s collects a message certificate for m in v , then m =m. 15
Lemma 26. Suppose that process s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v. If s has also collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v , then m=m .
Proof. Lemma 26 follows directly from Lemma 24 if v =v .
If v =v , Lemma 26 is a consequence of Lemma 25. eorem 7 (Consistency). If some correct participant delivers a message m and another correct participant delivers a message m , then m=m .
Proof. Lemma 22 claims that if message m is delivered by a correct process, then sender s has collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v. Besides that, s has also collected a message certificate for m in some installed view v (Lemma 22). Lemma 26 states that if s has collected a message certificate for both m and m , then m = m . Consequently, eorem 7 holds.
Lemma 27. Suppose that a correct participant p has delivered v.q , m,v messages (line 53 of Algorithm 3), where v is some installed view. en, every correct process q ∈ v , such that v ⊃v is installed, delivers m.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction.
Step: View v is a view which directly succeeds view v in a sequence of installed views. Hence, process q ∈v receives from at least one process in v that message m was delivered, checks the message certificate and delivers m (line 13 of Algorithm 3).
Induction
Step: A view v is installed in the system such that every correct process q ∈ v has delivered message m. We should prove that every correct process r ∈v , such that v is a view that directly succeeds view v in a sequence of installed views, will deliver m. Clearly, process r receives from at least one process in v that m was delivered and delivers m (line 13 of Algorithm 3).
Hence Lemma 27. eorem 8 (Validity). If a correct participant s broadcasts a message m, then every correct participant q eventually delivers m or process q leaves the system.
Proof. Lemma 19 claims that there is a view v final which includes every possible change that can be proposed in the execution. erefore, we should prove that every correct process q ∈v final eventually delivers m.
When process s broadcasts m, s includes its view of the system inside of a message (line 27 of Algorithm 3). Suppose that the current view of s is v. ere are two possible scenarios:
1. Process s collects a message certificate for m in v (line 37 of Algorithm 3 messages associated with some view v , Lemma 27 proves that every correct process that is a member of an installed view v ⊃v delivers m. is ensures that every correct process that is a member of v final delivers m if v =v final .
In the case when v =v final , reliable links and the fact that system can not be further reconfigured guarantee that every correct process that is a member of v final delivers m.
us, validity is satisfied. eorem 9 (Totality). If a correct participant p delivers a message m, then every correct participant q eventually delivers m or process q leaves the system.
When a correct participant p delivers a message m, p relays that message to every process that is a member of the current view of p (lines 24 and 46 of Algorithm 3). Suppose that the current view of p is v. Lemma 27 claims that if v.q processes that are members of v deliver message m, every correct process r that is a member of any subsequent installed view will deliver m.
ere are two possible scenarios: 1. Process p collects v.q messages for m (line 53 of Algorithm 3). 2. Process p does not collect v.q messages. However, p eventually installs a new view v and rebroadcasts a message for m to processes in v (line 24 of Algorithm 3). Process p collects v .q messages for m in view v or rebroadcasts the message again to processes in a new view v . Eventually, v "becomes" v final and then p collects an aforementioned quorum of messages. Consider a case where p wants to leave the system. en, p will not collect a quorum of for m in v final , because p is not a member of v final . However, p eventually reaches a view v final in which all reconfiguration requests are processed, except for −,p . And the system can not reconfigure from v final (verification at line 25 of Algorithm 1). Hence, p collects a quorum of for m associated with v final . 16
When p delivers a Byzantine quorum of messages associated with some view v , Lemma 27 proves that every correct process that is a member of an installed view v ⊃v delivers m. is ensures that every correct process that is a member of v final delivers m if v =v final .
us, totality is satisfied. eorem 10 (Non-triviality). A correct process does not send any messages before invoking a join() operation and after returning from leave() operation.
Proof. A correct process p starts sending messages once it invokes a join() operation. Moreover, p halts and stops sending any messages when p leaves the system.
Proof of Optimality
As we have already stated, our is, in a precise sense, optimal. Namely, we prove in this section that even if only one process in the system can fail, and it can fail by crashing, then it is impossible to implement a stronger primitive denoted with Strong Dynamic Byzantine Reliable Broadcast ( ). satisfies the same set of properties as (definitions 1 and 2), except that validity and totality properties are exchanged for strong validity and strong totality, respectively.
First, we define strong validity and strong totality. Second, we present the model we consider and prove that neither strong validity nor strong totality can be implemented in an asynchronous system where processes can leave and one process can crash ( §6.1).
Definition 13 (Strong Validity). If a correct participant s broadcasts a message m at time t, then every correct participant q ∈S(t) delivers m.
Definition 14 (Strong Totality). If a correct participant p delivers a message m at time t, then every correct participant q ∈S(t) delivers m.
Model. We consider an asynchronous system of N processes that communicate by exchanging messages.
ere are no bounds on message transmission delays and processing times. Moreover, at most one process can crash in any execution. Process that crashes at any point in time is called faulty. A process that is not faulty is said to be correct. Moreover, reliable links connect all pairs of processes.
Described model is the same as the model we assume in , except the failure model considered is crash-stop (not arbitrary failure model). From that perspective, this model is even stronger. Moreover, as we will present in the rest of the section, we analyze simple executions in which at most two processes (out of N) leave the system.
Impossibility Proofs
Strong Validity impossibility. Let R 1 be a run of some deterministic algorithm A, in which some process p has taken action a at time t. Let R 2 be another run of A, such that (i) p's initial state is the same in R 1 and R 2 , (ii) until time t, process p observes the same environment (e.g., sequence of messages delivered) in R 1 and R 2 . It follows that p also takes action a at time t in run R 2 .
Suppose that process s crashes at time t s = 0 in run R 1 . Moreover, some process p invokes a leave() operation of at time t >0. Because of the leave liveness of , p leaves the system at time t≥t .
Consider run R 2 in which process s broadcasts a message m at time t s =0, but all messages from s are delayed until time t + . Moreover, process p invokes a leave() operation of at time t and until time t observes the exact same environment as in R 1 . From p's perspective, run R 2 is indistinguishable from R 1 . Hence, p leaves the system at time t and does not deliver m which violates the strong validity of .
Strong Totality impossibility. Consider a deterministic, distributed algorithm A that implements (which ensures properties defined in definitions 1 and 2, except that totality is exchanged for strong totality). Algorithm A is a set of N programs, each associated with a single process in the system. Each such program contains operations of sending a message, receiving a message and processing information in the local memory. Recall that, here, we consider a crash-stop failure model where at most one process can crash. e activity of each process p is modeled as a sequence of events. e first event of process p is denoted by e 1 p , the second event of process p is denoted by e 2 p . e i-th event of process p is denoted by e i p . Event e i p can be: • send(q,m): p sends message m to process q, • deliver(q,m): reception of message m from process q, • internal event (all other events, e.g., x=5). Events may modify the state of the process. e state of process p after the occurrence of e k p is denoted by σ k p . e initial state of p is denoted by σ 0 p . Here we focus on one specific message m -broadcast in system. erefore, the state of some process p can take two values: (i) ⊥: which means that p did not -deliver message m; or (ii) : which means that p -delivered message m. Clearly, the following observations about the state of p hold:
• (σ 0 p =⊥); and • (σ i p =⊥) =⇒ (∀j <i:σ j p =⊥); and • (σ i p = ) =⇒ (∀j >i:σ j p = ).
Definition 15 (Local history of process p). Local history of process p is defined as the (possibly infinite) sequence of events of p: h p def = e 1 p e 2 p e 3 p ... . e prefix (of length k) of h p is denoted by: h k p def = e 1 p e 2 p ...e k p .
Definition 16 (Condition Set). Consider a local history h p of some process p such that σ k p = and σ k−1 p = ⊥, where k > 0. Moreover, suppose that t events from the prefix of length k of h p (h k p ) are deliver(q,m) (i.e., reception of some message m from some process q). We call the subsequence of h k p that includes only those t events a condition set of p denoted by C p s and |C p s | = t is the cardinality of condition set C p s . e set of all possible condition sets of process p is denoted by C p .
Definition 17 (Required Condition). Consider a condition set C p s of some process p such that cardinality of C p s is equal to t = |C p s |. We say that C p s is a required condition of p if and only if ∀C p s ∈C p :(C p s =C p s ) =⇒ (|C p s |≥t).
Informally, a condition set C p s represents all the messages some process p has received before -delivering some message m in an execution of A. A required condition C p s represents the messages necessary to be received by p in order for p to -deliver some message m. Moreover, a required condition C p s represents the "weakest" condition that must be satisfied in order for p to -deliver some message m. Hence, we are just interested in required conditions of some process p. Moreover, we focus on required conditions when no process leaves the system (i.e., N processes participate in A). en, we prove that if some processes invoke a leave() operation, strong totality can not be ensured (some might -deliver a message m, some might not). Let us provide few examples of required conditions found in some of the well-known (static) broadcast protocols:
• Best-Effort Broadcast ( ) [6]: A required condition for some process p to -deliver some message m includes just one message m received from the sender. • Uniform Reliable Broadcast ( ) [6]: A required condition for some process p to -deliver some message m includes the reception of two messages m (regardless of senders; two in a case when just one process can crash).
Definition 18. Consider a message m = t, c sent by some process in some execution of algorithm A. We say that m is a protocol message of algorithm A and arguments have the following meaning:
• t (Type): Type represents a predefined tag of m.
• c (Content): Content represents the value with which m is associated.
Parameter m of events send(q, m) and deliver(q, m) represents a protocol message.
Processes can leave the system. Some process p leaves the system and halts once p returns from leave() invocation. When leave() operation is invoked, p must "discover" whether some message m has been previously -delivered by any process in order to preserve strong totality. We say that, at the moment of invoking a leave() operation, p starts executing a distributed algorithm D that should enable p to -deliver some message m in the end of the execution of D if this message has been -delivered by any process. erefore, our goal is to show that algorithm D can not be implemented in an asynchronous environment. We assume that algorithm D is a full-information protocol [16, 15, 9] . A full-information protocol is a protocol executed in rounds, where in first round each process sends its local state (i.e., all protocol messages of algorithm A delivered and sent). e messages sent by processes in subsequent rounds consist the local state of processes and events learned in the previous round of a full-information protocol. Informally, every process in each round sends everything it has sent, delivered and observed up to this point in time. Finally, note that leaving process p can complete an arbitrary, but finite number of rounds of algorithm D (since p leaves eventually).
Lemma 28. Suppose that process q -delivered message m at time t and |S(t)|=N (i.e., no process left the system). Moreover, suppose that σ k q = and σ k−1 q =⊥, where k >0. If process p delivers the prefix of length l ≥k of local history of q during an execution of D, then p -delivers m (to preserve strong totality of ).
Proof. Suppose that (leaving) process p does not -deliver m and leaves the system. Since q -delivered m at time t (p∈S(t)) and p left the system without -delivering m, strong totality is violated. Hence, p -delivers m.
Lemma 28 proves that if (leaving) process p receives a (prefix of) local history of process q, where process q -delivered m, then p should also -deliver m (to preserve strong totality). However, we present two runs that prove that if p -delivers message m only once it delivers q's local history (through an execution of D), then strong totality can be violated.
Consider run R 1 in which some process q crashes at time t q , |S(t q )|=N (i.e., no process left the system) and no process -delivered a message m. Suppose that some process p invokes a leave() operation at time t >t q . Process p exchanges messages with other processes during the execution of D and leaves the system at time t>t without having -delivered m.
Consider run R 2 where some process q -delivers some message m at time t q and |S(t q )| = N. Moreover, q is the only process that has -delivered message m and every message from q to other processes from time t q is delayed until time t + . Suppose that process p invokes a leave() operation at time t >t q and that p observes the exact same environment as in R 1 until time t. Hence, p leaves the system at time t>t without -delivering m which breaks strong totality of . Figure 5 illustrates runs R 1 and R 2 in case N = 5 and a full-information protocol D consists of three rounds.
So far, we proved that strong totality is not ensured if (leaving) process p relies solely on receiving a (prefix of) history of process q (which has -delivered m) to -deliver m. Hence, process p must -deliver m once it receives histories from processes that have sent some protocol messages which are incorporated inside of required conditions of q.
Let us give an explanation. Consider a best-effort broadcast ( ) primitive. Suppose that some process q -delivered m -broadcast by s. We showed above that leaving process p can not wait to deliver local history of q. However, if p delivers a local history of s with the event specifying that m is sent to q, p should -deliver m (since q might have -delivered m). Consider a protocol message m with sender q such that ∀C r s : rc(C r s ) =⇒ deliver(q,m) ∈ C r s . Here, rc(C r s ) is logic predicate which is true if C r s is a required condition of process r; otherwise, it is false. Hence, leaving process p should -deliver m if it receives during an execution of D that process q has sent a protocol message m to r (event send(r,m) of process q). We can construct two similar runs as above to show that strong totality can be violated if r =q (messages from process r can be arbitrarily delayed, so leaving process p does not "discover" that r sent m or whether r delivered m). Hence, we need to analyze case where processes r and q are different.
We focus on a required condition of some process r. We suppose that if (leaving) process p receives local state of process r during an execution of D where it is clear that r did not deliver some message m, then p also does not -deliver m. Assume that this is not the case. We give a simple run R 3 that shows how strong totality can be violated. Consider system where N = 5 and processes A, B, C, D and E are in the system. Every required condition of process E includes a protocol message of type T sent by process D and processes A and B want to leave. ey start distributed algorithms D A and D B "concurrently". Processes send the same messages in 19 executions of D A and D B . Suppose that all processes receive messages from processes A, B, C and E in every round of D A and D B , except for the last round. In the last round, process A receives a message from D (and D did previously send a protocol message of type T to E) and -delivers m (note that A is aware that E did not -deliver m). Process B receives messages from A, B, C and E in the last round and it does not -deliver m. Strong totality is violated ( Figure 6 ). As we have stated already, we suppose that if (leaving) process p receives local state of some process r during an execution of D where it is clear that r did not -deliver some message m, then p also does not -deliver m. It is easy to develop R 4 similar to R 3 where all processes receive messages from processes A, B, C and D in every round of D A and D B , except for the last round. In the last round, process A receives messages from A, B, C and D and it -delivers m. However, process B receives a message from E and it does not -deliver m. Again, strong totality is violated (Figure 7 ). We proved that strong totality can not be implemented if there is one specific protocol message in every required condition of some process r. In a nutshell, the reason is that two different processes can receive different information in the end of an execution of protocol D (one execution started by one process, whereas other started by another; but, they run "concurrently"). More specifically, the state of N −1 processes at the beginning of the i-th round of a full-information protocol can be the same as at the beginning of the first round (in the case when one process out of N "carries" the information of interest). Hence, two different processes can reach different conclusions in the end of an execution of D (since one process receives the information from the single process who knows about it, whereas other process does not). erefore, we analyze a case when required conditions of some process r include events of delivery of messages of some type from every permutation of processes that are in the system. Intuitively, this means that algorithm for -delivery of some message m by r has a condition of a format "upon delivering #t 1 messages of type T 1 and upon delivering #t 2 messages of type T 2 and …". Finally, since one process can crash, values of t 1 ,t 2 ,... can be equal to at most N −1.
Without loss of generality, let us focus on a condition of -delivery of some message m by r informally defined by "upon delivering N − 1 messages of type T " (this represents the "strongest" condition for -delivery of some message; the proof given below can easily be generalized to cases when number of delivered messages of type T is less than N −1). It is easy to prove that a leaving process p must -deliver m if it "discovers" during an execution of D that N −2 processes have sent an appropriate protocol message of type T to r (for m, which represents a content of the protocol message).
Suppose now that two processes (out of N) want to leave and that they execute a distributed algorithm D "concurrently". We give a simple run that shows that it is possible to violate strong totality in this case. us, we prove that it is not possible to implement a protocol which ensures strong totality in an asynchronous system.
Consider a run R in which no process has -delivered message m, no process crashes and N =5. Moreover, processes p and q invoke a leave() operation. Without loss of generality, we assume that a full-information protocol D is composed of F rounds. Suppose that processes p, p 1 and p 2 sent a protocol message of type T to r, D p algorithm is started by p and D q algorithm is started by q. Suppose that p in every round of D p (and D q ) receives messages from itself, p 1 , p 2 and q. Also, suppose that other processes in every round of D p (and D q ) receive messages from all processes except p. Processes send the same messages in executions of D p nad D q . Process p finishes F -th round of D at time t by delivering local states from itself, p 1 , p 2 and q and -delivers m. However, q finishes F -th round of D at time t >t by delivering states from all processes except p and does not -deliver m. erefore, this run violates strong totality of ( Figure 8 depicts run R with F =3). In summary: 1. We proved that leaving process p can not wait to receive a local state of process q that has -delivered some message m ( Figure 5 ). 2. en, we focused on required conditions of some process r:
(a) If there is one specific protocol message with sender q included in every required condition of r, we proved that strong totality can be violated (figs. 6 and 7). (b) We proved that strong totality can be violated in the case when the condition of delivery of r has a format "upon delivering #t messages of type T " (Figure 8 ).
Related Work & Conclusions
vs. Static Byzantine Reliable Broadcast. We design with the goal of having a more general abstraction than static (Byzantine reliable broadcast [5, 18] ). A textbook specification of ensures these five properties: (1) Validity: If a correct process s broadcasts a message m, then every correct process eventually delivers m. (2) Totality: If a correct process p delivers a message m, then every correct process q eventually delivers m. (3) No duplication: No correct process delivers more than one message. (4) Integrity: If some correct process delivers a message m with sender s and process s is correct, then s previously broadcast m. (5) Consistency: If some correct process delivers a message m and another correct process delivers a message m , then m=m .
Notice that no duplication, integrity and consistency are the same for both and . Moreover, if we suppose that no process joins or leaves the system, then ensures the same properties as . Validity and totality properties are similar across the two abstractions, except that stipulates that only processes that do not leave the system deliver the appropriate messages; interestingly, we proved that stronger properties than these are impossible in our model. Clearly, 20 generalizes the properties of to a dynamic environment.
Asynchronous Reconfiguration. e question of whether reconfiguration of a system can be done without a consensus (or similar) primitive was answered positively by [1] . Aguilera et al. [1] presented DynaStore, a protocol which implements dynamic atomic storage in a completely asynchronous environment (i.e., without relying on consensus). DynaStore generates a graph of views which provides a way of identifying a sequence of views in which clients need to execute their r/w operations. 21 SmartMerge [17] and SpSn [10] proposed new approaches for asynchronous reconfiguration, which rely on la ice agreement (SmartMerge) or a speculating snapshot algorithm (SpSn). eir goal was to reduce the worst case communication complexity of reconfigurations and operations concurrent with reconfigurations. Finally, FreeStore [2] is an interesting alternative that introduced view generator, an abstraction that captures the agreement demands of reconfiguration protocols.
However, all discussed protocols [1, 17, 10, 2] were used for shared memory emulation. Moreover, they considered a crash-stop failure model. In contrast, we address the problem of a dynamic broadcasting system and assume an arbitrary (Byzantine) failure model.
Broadcast Applications. Reliable broadcast is one of the most pervasive primitives in distributed applications [22] . For instance, broadcast can be used for maintaining caches in cloud services [11] , in a publish subscribe network [8] , and Byzantine fault-tolerant versions of this primitive (e.g., the dynamic solution we present in this paper, or static solutions such as [5, 14, 19] ) are sufficiently strong for implementing decentralized online payments, i.e., cryptocurrencies [13] .
Conclusion. We have presented in this paper the specification of (dynamic Byzantine reliable broadcast), as well as an asynchronous algorithm implementing this primitive.
generalizes traditional Byzantine reliable broadcast which operates in static environments, to work in a dynamic network.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate an arbitrary failure model in implementing dynamic systems, in contrast to previous work that considered a crash-stop failure model. e main merit of our approach is that we did not rely on a consensus building blocks, i.e., can be implemented completely asynchronously.
